Tying and Exclusive Dealing: Anticompetitive Restraints in Antitrust Law

Tying and exclusive dealing are two related categories of potentially anticompetitive conduct in competition law. **Tying** is selling one good (the tying product) on the condition that the buyer also takes a second, distinct good (the tied product). Unlike ordinary product bundling, which can be a legitimate promotion, tying is coercive: the buyer cannot get the wanted product without the unwanted one. The harm is that a firm with power in the tying market can leverage it to capture the tied-product market, foreclosing rivals and reducing choice. In the US, a tying claim under the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act generally requires two separate products, conditioning of one on the other, sufficient market power in the tying product, and a substantial effect on commerce in the tied product. EU law addresses tying under Articles 101 and 102 where the products are distinct. The landmark US v. Microsoft case examined whether bundling Internet Explorer with Windows was illegal tying, analyzed under the rule of reason. **Exclusive dealing** restricts what, from whom, or where a buyer may purchase, or bars a supplier from selling competitors' products. Its main competitive harm is foreclosure, cutting rivals off from enough customers or supply to compete effectively. Forms range from full-line forcing (buy only from one supplier) to de facto exclusivity created by loyalty rebate schemes and requirements contracts that reward single-source buying. US courts apply the Clayton Act Section 3 and the rule of reason; the EU assesses whether a dominant firm's exclusivity forecloses \"as-efficient competitors,\" treating high-percentage exclusive purchasing (around 80 percent or more) as a potential abuse rather than per se illegal. Exclusivity can be procompetitive when it prevents free-riding on a supplier's investments, so it is judged by effects, not banned outright. See The EU Digital Markets Act: Ex-Ante Rules for Big Tech Gatekeepers.