The Insurance Retreat from High-Risk US Property Markets
Carriers are withdrawing from the riskiest US property markets: State Farm stopped writing new California homeowners policies in 2023 and non-renewed about 30,000 property policies in March 2024, while the California FAIR Plan roughly doubled from ~154,000 policies in 2019 to ~339,000 by end-2023. Self-insuring isn't available to most, since mortgages require cover. The withdrawal is the price signal working — a market saying don't rebuild here.
Private insurers are withdrawing from the highest-risk parts of the United States property market. This is not a market failure in the usual sense — it is the price mechanism working, and it is colliding with the fact that millions of people live in those places. ## What is happening In California, State Farm stopped writing new homeowners policies in 2023, and in March 2024 announced it would not renew roughly 30,000 homeowners, rental dwelling and other property policies, alongside about 42,000 commercial apartment policies. Other major carriers reduced their exposure over the same period. Displaced policyholders fall back on the **California FAIR Plan**, the state's insurer of last resort, whose policy count roughly doubled between 2019 and the end of 2023 — from about 154,000 to about 339,000 — and continued climbing after. Its aggregate exposure has grown several-fold over the same period. In Florida, average premiums are far above the national figure, though published averages vary widely with methodology — state regulator figures for a standard single-family all-perils policy run in the mid-thousands, while broader market surveys quote figures two to three times higher. The direction is unambiguous even where the level is disputed. ## Why "just don't insure it" isn't available The natural response — save the premium, self-insure, move if the house burns — works only for a specific person: someone who owns their home outright and can absorb a total loss. Two things block it for everyone else. **Mortgages require insurance.** A lender protects its collateral, and the majority of US homes carry a mortgage. Most owners in high-risk areas are contractually unable to self-insure even if they judge it rational. **The timing risk is unhedgeable individually.** Premiums saved for three years do not cover a total loss in year four. Self-insurance requires already having the capital, which is precisely what insurance exists to substitute for. ## The three props holding the market up 1. **Mortgage requirements**, which sustain demand regardless of price. 2. **State pools of last resort**, which are typically underfunded and hold the power to assess all policyholders statewide when they run short — the assessable mutual's collection problem reappearing at state scale. See Mutual Insurance and the Assessable Mutual. 3. **Near-true-cost pricing**, where premiums have been allowed to rise. ## The reframe A premium of many thousands a year is not a market malfunction. It is a **statement about the property**: this house is genuinely likely to be destroyed. Insurance withdrawal is the clearest managed-retreat signal available — a market saying *do not rebuild here* — and rate caps and state pools work by suppressing that signal and smearing the cost across other policyholders and taxpayers. Which makes this a political problem rather than an actuarial one. The actuarial answer is unambiguous and has been for years. What is genuinely hard is that the answer implies people should leave places they live, and no democracy has found a graceful way to say that.